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This paper examines a formal review of strategy undertaken by the African National 
Congress (ANC) and its influential incorporated ally, the South African Communist Party 
(SACP), in 1978-79. This review led to changes in their understanding of the immediate 
strategic tasks before them. These changes turned on the relationship between political and 
military forms of revolutionary struggle and the tactics of their combination. 
ANC and SACP strategy between the early 1960s and 1978 centred on the development of a 
popular armed struggle, situated mainly in the rural areas, for the seizure of state power in 
South Africa. [2] The strategic review of 1978-79 did not alter the essence of this 
perspective. What the review did change was the ANC's understanding of the means it 
should employ to build an organised revolutionary political base for itself inside South 
Africa. Whereas, since the early 1960s, the ANC had behaved as if armed activity was the 
major means to develop an organised political base [3], in 1979 the review concluded the 
main means should rather be political organisation by political means - legal, semi-legal 
and underground. 
The ANC's and SACP's interest in such a popular political base was common to 
revolutionary struggles from the 1930s. Revolutionaries invariably fought wars that were, as 
Rapoport has termed it, "not symmetrical" [4] - in which revolutionaries did not possess the 
resources of the state they were seeking to overthrow. The usual means revolutionaries used 
to redress this asymmetry was to secure the support or compliance of the civilian population. 
Without redressing the asymmetry, revolutionaries generally stood little chance of success. 
In practice, the review did not benefit the ANC's and SACP's armed struggle as intended - 
for reasons outlined towards the end of this paper. Instead, it equipped the ANC and SACP 
with a formally sanctioned framework to become involved in, and in later years to benefit 
considerably from, popular political struggles conducted in the legal and semi-legal spheres 
inside South Africa. It also facilitated the ANC's later role in the formation of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
Moreover, when it became clear in the late 1980s that their armed struggle was a failure 
(assessed in the terms in which they had conceived of it), the political initiatives sanctioned 
by the 1978-79 review meant the ANC and SACP were well placed, in comparison to their 
rivals, to place their major emphasis on the politics of popular action. 
The ANC's 1978-79 strategic review, a formal exercise instituted by the ANC's national 
executive committee (NEC), had two stages. In the first stage, from about June to December 
1978, sections of the ANC leadership made concerted attempts, including a visit to Vietnam, 
to find remedies for their organisation's weakness and difficulties. These attempts led to a 
second stage: the appointment in January 1979 of a commission to review ANC strategy, 
tactics and operational structures. This commission reported in March of that year and most 
of its central recommendations were formally adopted by the ANC in August. 
This paper relies substantially on original research, mainly on interviews conducted between 
1989 and 1991. [5] If made available for public scrutiny, confidential ANC documents of the 
late 1970s should bear out the weight of the interviews. 
The origins of the ANC's emphasis on armed activity between 1961 and 1978 lay in the 
interplay of three sets of factors. They were the theoretical revolutionary discourse of the 
ANC and SACP after 1961 [6], the strategic examples set by other contemporary anti- 
colonial and revolutionary struggles imbibed by the ANC and SACP [7], and a fairly general 
desire within ANC and SACP ranks to retaliate against what was seen as a brutal, violent 
state. [8] Together these factors locked the ANC and SACP into an assumption that 
revolutionary armed struggle was not merely the means by which ultimately to contend for 
state power but also the principal means by which to progress in each phase of escalation 
towards that eventual goal. 
When the ANC finally succeeded in actually resuming armed action inside South Africa in 
1976, after a 13-year silence, its senior operational organ, the Revolutionary Council (RC), 
saw matters very much in these terms. The ANC saw itself then as being in "the early stages 
of people's war" in which the "primary activity" must be "engaging, harrassing and 
dispersing the enemy's armed and police forces, and hitting enemy installations 
(administrative, economic, military, communications, etc) in order to reduce its will and 
capacity to pursue the struggle".[9] Political mobilisation was, a "precondition for the long- 
term success of armed struggle". [l01 That is, political organisation was subject to military 
imperatives. 
THE 1978-79 strategic review was stimulated primarily by the ANC's difficulty in situating 
a sustained armed presence inside South Africa. The ANC came to identify the absence of an 
organised political base able to receive, securely locate and protect an armed presence as the 
major reason for this difficulty. The review offered a new answer on how to create this 
political base - in order eventually to enhance the prospects for what it saw as the main 
means to achieve state power, namely revolutionary armed struggle. 
The uprisings in Soweto and elsewhere in 1976 had indicated an immediate potential for 
popular insurrectionary activity in urban areas. The ANC had largely disregarded such 
potential in strategic formulations after "Operation Mayibuye" had been still-born in 1963; 
the SACP only slightly less so. [l l] The urban-centred uprisings of 1976, which had 
depended neither on ANC armed activity (there had been none inside South Africa for 13 
years) nor on ANC political activity, prompted some in the ANC to begin to "rethink the 
possibilities for domestic popular involvement in revolutionary struggle. [l21 
Despite state repression, oppositional political ferment inside South Africa had indicated 
possibilities for legal and serni-legal popular political mobilization against apartheid. These 
possibilities had been apparent since the early 1970s, with the rise of the black consciousness 
movement and independent trade unions, but the ANC had given scant attention to them. 
By late 1978, the state was adapting a range of political and economic relations to dissipate 
the threats to white rule and capitalism it had identified in the anti-apartheid ferment in the 
mid- 1970s. [ l3 1 These adaptations formed part of a comprehensive new security doctrine, 
"Total Strategy". The strategy's main political device was the demobilization of militancy in 
some black sectors and their co-option into alignment with the state. 
Within the region, the South African state combined military, economic and diplomatic 
pressures to ensure the obeisance of neighbouring independent African states as well as their 
eschewal of support for the ANC. This was a response to a shift in the regional balance after 
Angolan and Mozambican independence, renewed ANC armed activity and guerrilla war in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. [l41 
The exodus of several thousand young militants from South Africa after the 1976 uprisings 
had given the ANC, for the first time since the mid-1960s, a small army of young and fit 
guerrillas. [l51 Most recruits to the ANC in exile after 1976 had wanted to go into MK. [l61 
This, too, was precisely where the ANC leadership wanted the bulk of them to go. [l71 
IV 
By October 1978, there were reasons to question not mqrely the adequacy of the ANC's 
initiatives in this developing situation; there was also a compelling argument against their 
character. In exile, the ANC's operational organs had several weaknesses. There was a 
dislocation between political and military organs on the RC. Political organs were relatively 
weak and amorphous, whereas military organs predominated. [l81 The military was 
resorting to short-term infiltrations commanded, controlled and supplied from abroad. The 
few attempts at building internal military structures had met with little success; and attempts 
to indigenize an armed capacity had come to be deferred. Inside South Africa, formal ANC 
underground structures remained extremely small and weak - despite growing popular 
amenability to ANC perspectives. 
On the military side in exile, control of armed activity came under an RC department known 
as Central Operations Headquarters (COH). [l91 COH had been set up after the 1976 
uprisings 1201 and was a revamp of an earlier MK operations section. [21] COH was headed 
by Joe Modise with Joe Slovo as his deputy [22], and was a purely operational command. By 
1978, COH was relating to regional COH machineries in the forward areas (independent 
African states immediately adjacent to South Africa - Botswana, Lesotho, and Mozambique- 
Swaziland which had joint machineries). Each COH regional machinery oversaw armed 
activity in a particular area of South Africa. [23] 
By mid-1978, a "good proportion" of new recruits from the 1976 exodus of militant black 
youths who had already completed their guerrilla training had been deployed, according to 
COH. [24] The number this represented is unclear. In June 1978, South African police 
estimated that at least 4,000 young black South Africans' were in guerrilla training camps 
following the 1976 uprisings, the majority of them with the ANC - perhaps as many as 
3,000.[25] Given difficulties of the time, the "good proportion" probably refers to fewer 
than 200 military cadres. 
COH believed that news of some MK activities was being suppressed. The Minister of Police 
appeared to concede this in February 1978 when he said that a number of clashes between 
ANC guerrillas and security forces had remained unpublicized. [26] The number of MK 
strikes between 1976 and the end of 1978 was between 37 and 57, many of them modest in 
character. [27] Over that period, according to police statistics, the number of ANC guerrillas 
killed or captured was 35. [28] This indicates that the casualtylstrike ratio probably fell 
somewhere between one guerrilla casualty for each attack and two guerrilla casualties for 
every three attacks. 
RC officials felt in mid-1978 that "the flow of combat actions had significantly raised the 
prestige and following of the ANC both inside and outside the country". [29] ANC armed 
activity was undoubtedly a factor in the increase in the popularity of the ANC among black 
South Africans evident over this and the subsequent period, according to accounts of anti- 
apartheid activists. 1301 
But it was apparent to some on the RC that the ANC had some way to go towards developing 
sustained armed activity. They saw their major obstacle as the "lack of sufficient facilities in 
adjacent territories". [3 l] 1 Gradually, some on the RC argued that this disadvantage could be 
mitigated only by building an internal revolutionary base capable of indigenizing an armed 
presence. Within COH, there was dissatisfaction with the quality of political reconstruction 
work inside South Africa. [32] COH wanted internal reception networks for returning 
guerrillas [33], but very few existed in 1978. 
Between 1969 and 1976, there had been no ANC organ charged clearly with internal political 
work; theoretically, this was the task of the entire RC but, in practice, the RC had been 
dominated by military considerations. [34] Then, in 1977, the ANC had established an 
Internal Reconstruction and Development Department (IRD) to oversee political 
reconstruction inside South Africa. But IRD, which initially came under weak leadership, 
was the only RC department concerned with political work [35]; the remaining eight or nine 
emergent RC sections were engaged in military tasks. [3$] From early 1978, this imbalance 
was gradually moderated with the appointment of Mac Maharaj as IRD secretary. A 
combative and innovative personality, Maharaj was a major protagonist in battles over 
strategy on the RC. He demanded that more emphasis be given to political reconstruction 
inside South Africa by political means. [37] 
Below the RC, COH regional commands in the forward areas usually operated separately 
from initially indistinct regional IRD political structures. [38] To the extent that there was 
any liaison or co-ordination between them at regional level it was discretionary, informal 
and, often, non-existent. The RC's ability to co-ordinate specializations and to develop 
coherent politico-military perspectives was hampered by frequent absenteeism from its 
meetings. [39] This was often because RC members had to attend to other ANC or SACP 
diplomatic and administrative tasks. 
Inside South Africa by mid-1978, IRD had begun trying to rebuild the embryonic political 
underground structure established in the mid-1970s in Natal, the Transvaal and eastern Cape 
- although their cores had been smashed by 1977 in Natal and the Transvaal. The size of the 
formal domestic political underground after 1976 numbered about 50 units, according to one 
ANC leader's unofficial estimate. [40] This probably involved no more than about 200 
people, most in urban centres. Underground units fostered by IRD from 1978 were concerned 
mainly with propaganda work, creating reception networks and developing linkages into 
popular organisations. 1411 
In the first stage of the review, comprising mainly discussions and arguments at leadership 
level in late 1378, the ANC and SACP found themselves grappling with the reality that 
armed activity was not, of itself, succeeding in building the revolutionary political base 
necessary to wage popular armed struggle. Disputes over the solution took a number of 
forms. 
Some on the RC argued that targets chosen for COH's armed activities were often 
inappropriate to political needs. [42] They also said that it made little sense to rely on 
combat groups sent into the country from abroad. [43] This pattern meant time and energy 
were wasted on a host of specialities - for surveillance teams, logistics and ordnance 
departments, and for the combatants themselves. [44] It made more sense to organise people 
living inside the country to mount attacks. [45] Some RC political personnel also argued that 
using externally controlled combat units was encouraging the ANC's potential constituency 
inside South Africa to wait passively for exile-based AN&: military activity instead of 
themselves becoming involved in it. [44] 
To this, COH responded that involving people in the ANC's potential constituency was 
impossible because of the lack of progress in building an organised popular revolutionary 
political base inside South Africa. [47] COH, which had sometimes behaved in the past as if 
its military activities would create such a base, now began to argue with increasing 
vehemence that it was, instead, the task of political workers to do so. [48] COH added that it 
could not wait for the political section to produce the political goods; it had to meet another 
immediate demand: that the ANC be seen to be striking at the South African state. [49] It 
had to keep the pot boiling. COH argued that the solution to most of its military problems 
lay in increased political organisation inside South Africa. [50] 
To this, some in IRD responded that they were desperately short of suitable resources and 
personnel to do political work, and their work was often frustrated by COH itself. 15 l ]  
Moreover, they said that to conceive of internal political work from the outset as something 
that should be conducted merely to service the imperatives of military struggle, as COH 
apparently did, would be counter-productive. Rather, political work should be conducted 
according to its own imperatives, and COH could expect only spin-off benefits. [52] 
A view gradually developed among some RC members that underlying their difficulties 
lurked basic questions of revolutionary theory, strategy and practice. Rhetorically, the ANC 
had long maintained that the political leadership directed and guided the military. But, in late 
1978, some within COH began to come around to what was originally the view of some in 
WD, that the ANC was "showing grave weaknesses which, if uncorrected, could result in a 
militarist deviation". [53] 
In the course of its attempts to resolve its problems, a small RC delegation visited Vietnam in 
October 1978. [54] A report on the visit, written by Slovo, identified a number of general 
propositions which it said had guided Vietnamese revolutionaries. These should be creatively 
applied by the ANC. These propositions centred on the need for armed struggle to be 
continually related to political needs and to be conceived of as dependent upon the strength 
of political organisation; moreover, the report suggested that a revolutionary vanguard could 
best relate to its potential constituency by means of a front of legal and semi-legal 
organizations which could play a considerable role in building a revolutionary political base. 
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The report also argued that much ANC practice hitherto had been militaristic. The ANC had 
started from the premise that armed activity would help regenerate conditions for political 
work but had then behaved as if armed activity was the movement's primary task. [56] 
Post-1976 military activity had been taking place in something of a void; most of it could not 
be related to an organised political base or to regional or local political issues and ANC tasks. 
[57] Moreover, without effective political organisation, without a mass political base, the 
military struggle could not mount a challenge for state power. But, alleged the report, the 
ANC lacked not merely an organised internal base but also a clear and detailed strategy for 
developing one. [58] 
Slovo and others now felt the ANC had to reopen the debate on how to achieve an organized 
domestic political revolutionary base. In the past, the ANC had 
not paid sufficient attention to the militant political 
struggle inside the country, to the possibilities of 
combining legal and illegal actions and relating them to our 
political-military strategy. We had not given proper weight 
to the significance of the many mass organisations which had 
recently arisen; and we had sometimes taken sectarian 
positions towards them ... 1591 
Important voices in COH now began to argue that the ANC's war had not really begun at all, 
whatever the contrary claims of ANC propaganda [60] and the views expressed by COH and 
the RC after the 1976 uprisings. [61] Slovo's report argued that the ANC was at a stage when 
the "main task was to concentrate on mass political organisation and legal and illegal 
mobilisation". [62] 
It was something that Maharaj and others had been arguing for some time - though they 
rejected a view of political struggle, apparently held by some in COH, which conceived of it 
from the outset as merely a servant of military struggle. Now, Slovo and others were 
suggesting, armed activity should play merely a supportive, secondary and auxilliary role in 
the construction of a popular revolutionary base [63] - the better eventually to service an all- 
round armed revolutionary assault. The main means for developing this base should be "the 
building of a broad front" on issues of immediate material relevance to the ANC's potential 
constituency inside South Africa. [64] A broad front could, they now argued, prompt a 
"mass upsurge [which], together with armed confrontation, would lead to the winning of 
people's power". [65] 
A copy of the report on the Vietnam visit was presented to an NEC meeting in late 1978. A 
special meeting of the NEC and RC was held in Luanda, Angola, from December 27 1978 to 
January 1 1979. [66] The context of the meeting was a view that IRD was "not delivering 
the goods". [67] The Luanda meeting elected a commission, which it named the Politico- 
Military Strategy Commission (PMSC), to consider the report's arguments as well as other 
opinions and options. [68] This heralded the second stage of the review. In August 1979, the 
NEC accepted most PMSC recommendations - with one crippling exception, dealt with 
below. [69] 
The members of the PMSC were: ANC president Oliver Tambo as chairman, Joe Gqabi, 
Moses Mabhida, Thabo Mbeki, Joe Modise and Joe Slovo. [70] Its terms of reference 
covered ANC political and military perspectives and operational structures. [7 l] Their 
recommendations echoed many perspectives for underground and popular mobilization 
already being development by IRD under Maharaj and contained in Slovo's report on the 
Vietnam visit. 
The four strategic lines recommended by the PMSC and accepted by the NEC were that the 
ANC should: one, elaborate an overall strategy based on mass mobilization of people inside 
South Africa; two, create inside the country the broadest possible national front of 
organizations and people for national liberation, and win this front into alignment with the 
ANC; three, draw into ANC underground structures those promising activists thrown up in 
popular organizations and in popular anti-apartheid struggles; and four, grasp that military- 
type operations developed out of political activity and should be guided by the needs and 
level of political organisation. [72] 
Of these, the PMSC identified the second - the creation hf the broad front - as the most 
important immediate task before the ANC. [73] The PMSC reasoned that if the ANC were to 
build a domestic political base it had to relate to people at large; this meant becoming deeply 
involved in popular organisations operating in the legal and semi-legal sphere. 
The major theme of PMSC thinking was that the ANC: 
had to make a deliberate turn to the masses for the purpose 
of teaching them and learning from them. We had for too long 
acted as if the repressive conditions made mass legal and 
semi-legal work impossible. If the people had taught us 
anything through the initiatives they had taken in the 
preceding five years, it was that the potential for political 
struggle [had] never [been] exhausted. And, if our own 
independent efforts had taught us anything, it was that our 
efforts would reach a dead-end unless they had a broader 
political base. [74] 
The militarist vanguardism of the past had manifestly failed. If the ANC neglected to "turn to 
the masses" it would become one of "the spectators in years to come". [75] A broad popular 
front was the channel for the necessary dialogue. Membership of the front should be based on 
an organisation's commitment to political freedoms and opposition to racist rule. [76] The 
PMSC said ANC activists had to be present whenever people acted against apartheid - no 
matter how inchoate that popular resistance might be - in order to steer organization in a 
revolutionary direction. It meant the ANC "could not shun any organisation engaged in such 
activities merely on the ground that it did not embrace [the ANC's] long-term revolutionary 
aims or criticised part of [the ANC's] strategy". [77] 
Building a front should be, the PMSC recommended, the primary task of the ANC 
underground for the foreseeable future. [78] The underground had to develop ways to insert 
the ANC's political purposes into popular organizations and resistance. The PMSC argued 
that the ANC's illegality meant it had to develop a subtle relationship with the front: 
The guiding hand of our liberation movement did not always 
have to be seen publicly or acknowledged. Our work had to 
proceed in a way which could not unnecessarily expose the 
legal and semi-legal organisations to more intense enemy 
harassment and provide the excuse to destroy these public 
bodies. [79] 
The PMSC added that sectarian behaviour by some ANC members would have to stop. The 
state's restructuring, one of whose intentions was to win over a portion of the ANC's 
potential constituency, did not allow for such behaviour. The Commission saw a distinct role 
for the ANC in stimulating more popular organizations - trade unions, civic organizations 
and internal committees of Sactu, among others. [81] And it criticized the ANC for its past 
inability to develop any strategic approach on the bantustans. [82] 
The PMSC suggested a number of future campaigns. One should be launched to repopularize 
the Freedom Charter. COHIMK should choose targets which highlighted particular demands 
in the Freedom Charter. [83] The ANC should help escalate campaigns against local 
government structures created for sectors of the black population. These campaigns should 
culminate in their "permanent destruction" in order to reduce "the capacity of the enemy to 
govern our people". [84] It also saw boycott as one tactic which could damage the state's 
capacity to govern whilst activizing the ANC's potential constituency. Boycott tactics 
should suit circumstances. [85] Forthcoming elections for the government-created South 
African Indian Council were specifically earmarked for action. [86] 
Moreover, the ANC and its allies had to lend all possible support to the struggle to "build a 
progressive trade union movement inside the country which rejected all attempts to isolate 
the workers from the struggle for national liberation". [87] This reflected ANC suspicions 
over the position taken by a number of the better organized emerging industrial trade unions 
that they should, at least temporarily, hold back from a national political involvement. At the 
same time, the PMSC identified an immediate insurrectionary potential in urban black 
townships. [88] It suggested that this potential should be developed within a perspective of 
protracted struggle. Popular uprisings, the PMSC suggested, would probably punctuate this 
protracted struggle and raise it to a higher plane - without necessarily being decisive. 
The PMSC's central strategic formulation was that 
people's power in South Africa would be won by 
revolutionary violence in a protracted armed struggle which 
must involve the whole people and in which partial and 
general mass uprisings would play a vital role. [89] 
Within this perspective, the role of the envisaged front was to 
engage the mass of our people in ever-growing political 
struggle to weaken the enemy, to create effective revolutionary 
bases as the foundation of a developing armed struggle, and to 
win the aims of our national democratic revolution. [90] 
This perspective still turned on popular armed struggle for the seizure of state power. It laid 
more emphasis on political work by political means than any ANC strategic formulation 
since 1961. It saw only a secondary role for armed activity in the construction of a popular 
revolutionary base. But, still, the strategic vision was one in which political organization was 
ultimately seen as subject to military imperatives - notwithstanding ambiguity in some 
formulations developed in the course of the review. Where there was ambiguity, it was 
settled in practice in future years in favour of the military by the huge imbalance in favour of 
the military in ANC operational organs which persisted after 1979. This bias continued 
largely because the NEC refused to accept one of the PMSC's key recommendations. 
Before dealing with this rejection, however, it is convenient briefly to point out that, 
accompanying the PMSC's recognition of insurrectionary potential, were two shifts in 
strategic thinking. One was towards the view that urban rather than rural areas were the 
major terrain for a revolutionary challenge against the South African state. A second was the 
ANC's and SACP's (re)discovery of the importance of sectoral political struggles. These 
incipient changes imposed new demands on ANC organisation. the critical one being an 
improved ability to relate different forms of struggle to each other. 
The NEC rejected a PMSC recommendation that the ANC develop a smaller, more cerebral 
and more muscular RC. As noted, the RC was afflicted by predominence of the military, 
absenteeism and inter-departmental tensions. These problems seriously weakened the RC's 
ability to analyse successes and failures, to overcome political-military parallelism, and to 
develop co-ordinated or integrated political-military perspectives. The PMSC suggested 
reducing the RC from some 20 to about 10 members, comprising the ANC's most talented 
strategists. RC members should be freed from all non-operational ANC tasks. The new organ 
should reflect a much stronger political presence. Crucially, it should have increased quasi- 
executive powers of decision-making on internal work. [91] The major reason for the 
rejection of this recommendation was, according to some, a fear among some NEC members 
that a new central operational organ of this kind could develop into a locus of power to rival 
the NEC. [92] 
This rejection had far-reaching and damaging results. The RC continued essentially as 
before, with much the same membership, personal and interdepartmental rivalries, and 
individual strategic mindsets. There was only marginal improvement in political-military 
co-ordination as a result of the review. What improvement there was occurred mainly in RC 
subsidiary structures, known as the "senior organs". These were mini-RCs set up in the 
forward areas; they existed until 1983. Some minor improvements in IRD representation on 
the RC did little to alter military predominence. 
The result of the continued shortcomings in the RC was that what political advances were 
made in later years to 1983 were not of a kind which could absorb, sustain and integrate a 
military combat presence in the way the PMSC report envisaged: military asymmetry could 
not be redressed. Military and political work continued essentially in parallel to each other. 
Military combat continued to take mainly the form of short-term penetrations commanded. 
and supplied from abroad. Whatever the ANC's theoretical or rhetorical advances in the 
course of the strategic review, ambitions and jealousies at the top level of leadership had 
crippled the ANC's ability to translate them fully into practice. 
The review did, however, sanction a number of ANC political interventions in the legal and 
semi-legal spheres. These ANC initiatives coalesced with other, often significantly 
autonomous, forces and developments inside South Africa to stimulate popular anti-apartheid 
carnvainns in South Africa in the 1980s. These initiatives eaui~ued the ANC to benefit from 
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the popular political ferment after 1981. Among these benefitikere the UDF in 1983 and 
COSATU in 1985. 
The prescience of the ANC's 1978-79 strategic review may lead some in hindsight either to 
conclude that the ANC was singularly responsible for the formation of the UDF, or to want 
to convey that impression. Earlier versions of this paper have verged on giving the former 
impression. New information has come to light which does not support this veiled 
suggestion. Rather, the ANC was one among several progenitors of the UDF and COSATU 
- although the ANC was undoubtedly the major beneficiary of their formation. There is a 
paradox in this: had the ANC alone been progenitor of the UDF and COSATU, it could 
probably never have derived as much benefit from them as it did. 
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